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ABSTRACT 
Seventeen percent of the average monthly cellular phone bill in 
2004 was comprised of federal, state, and local taxes. As the 
number of wireless subscribers across the nation continues to 
increase, states, cities, and counties are increasingly seizing  upon 
cellular taxation as a panacea for budget shortfalls. The Maryland 
Tax Court’s recent decision in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Department 
of Finance for Baltimore City held state and county taxes on the 
sale of individual cellular lines as legal excise taxes rather than 
illegal sales taxes. This iBrief will highlight the origins of 
telecommunications taxation, examine the ruling in T-Mobile in 
detail, present the arguments in opposition to disproportional 
cellular taxation, and conclude by anticipating what the future 
might hold for the cellular industry. 
INTRODUCTION 
¶1 The cellular phone industry has experienced tremendous growth in 
the United States recently, with the number of subscribers nationwide 
increasing from 16 million in 1993, to 163 million in 2003,2 to over 207 
million by the end of 2005.3  State and local governments have rushed to 
meet this expansion in volume with taxation.4  Officials are particularly 
eager to tax cellular phones because the charges to individuals each month 
are often small enough to go unnoticed but in the aggregate are capable of 
                                                     
1 J.D. Candidate, 2007, Duke University School of Law; B.S. in Mathematics, 
2004, Allegheny College. 
2  See Scott Mackey, The Excessive State and Local Tax Burden on Wireless 
Telecommunications Service, STATE TAX NOTES, Jul. 19, 2004, at 182. 
3 Wireless Quick Facts, 
http://files.ctia.org/pdf/Wireless_Quick_Facts_April_06.pdf (last visited Nov. 
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4 Ken Belson, Cities with Budget Woes Hit Up Cell Phone Users, N.Y. TIMES, 
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generating substantial revenue.5  This revenue is so substantial in practice, 
in fact, that cellular phone subscribers paid an estimated $17.8 billion in 
federal, state, and local taxes in 2004.6  Several major taxes are primarily 
responsible for this staggering figure.  First, the federal government applies 
a series of taxes to every cellular carrier, ranging from the federal regulatory 
fee imposed by the FCC to defray its operating costs, to the federal 
universal service fee, a tax designed to subsidize service to high cost service 
areas.7  These federal charges are variable but in 2005 totaled 
approximately 6% of the average bill.8  The U.S. Department of Treasury’s 
recent decision to terminate collection of the 3% federal excise tax 
beginning July 31, 2006 after five Courts of Appeals declared it illegal will 
reduce wireless carriers’ burdens accordingly.9 
¶2 Second, after the federal taxes are applied to a wireless bill, state 
and local levies are administered. States, cities, counties, and municipalities 
tax cellular lines in a variety of ways, including sales taxes, use taxes, 
excise taxes, gross receipts taxes, and additional universal service fund 
fees.10  The sum of these charges varies dramatically from state to state, 
ranging from a low of 1.11% in Nevada to a high of 16.21% in 
Washington.11 
¶3 When these manifold state and federal taxes are combined, the 
results are quite dramatic—total cellular phone taxes in 2004 amounted to 
17% of the average customer’s bill.12  This tax rate is roughly double that 
applied to other services and is surpassed only by the high tax rates13 
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6 Id. 
7 See Cingular Wireless Additional Charge Details, 
http://www.cingular.com/customer_service/additional_charges_results (last 
visited Nov. 16, 2006). 
8 Scott Woolley, How to Duck Cell Phone Taxes, FORBES, Jun. 6, 2005, 
http://www.forbes.com/technology/2005/06/06/cz_sw_0606cellphone.html.
9 See Deborah Pryce, Federal Government Hangs Up on the Tele Tax (June 9, 
2006), http://www.house.gov/pryce/06%20releases/060906_tele_tax_op-ed.htm. 
This issue will be discussed further in this iBrief infra Part I, The Origins of 
Telecommunications Taxation.
10 Taxes and Fees Explained, 
http://www.stopaddingtomybill.com/about_taxexplained.aspx (last visited Nov. 
16, 2006). 
11 Dennis Cauchon, City, State Cell Phone Taxes on the Rise, USA TODAY, May 
8, 2005, http://www.usatoday.com/news/nation/2005-05-08-cellphone-
taxes_x.htm. 
12 Belson, supra note 4. 
13 See infra Part III, “The Arguments Against Disproportional Cellular 
Taxation.”  
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assessed against the alcohol, drug, and petroleum industries.14  Taxation of 
wireless communication at such exorbitant levels is counterproductive and 
is unsupported by the historic justifications for telecommunications taxes.15  
A brief survey of the history of taxation within this field serves to 
underscore this conclusion. 
I. THE ORIGINS OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS TAXATION 
¶4 Federal taxation of the telecommunications industry dates back to 
the early twentieth century.16  The recently eviscerated federal excise tax17 
was established by the federal government in 1898 as a temporary levy on 
what was then a luxury service—long-distance telephone communication—
in order to help fund the Spanish-American War.18  The excise tax was 
repealed in 1902 but was reintroduced during World War I.19  In 1941, it 
was expanded to apply to local telephone calls and was used to help finance 
World War II, the Korean War, and the Vietnam War.20 
¶5 In recent years, however, public outcry against the imposition of the 
federal excise tax has increased. Citizens objected to the disproportional 
taxation of communication in particular as it ceased to be a luxury service.  
This outcry was validated when five Courts of Appeals declared the federal 
excise tax illegal as applied,21 leading the U.S. Treasury Department to 
announce recently that it would no longer require providers to apply the tax 
to cellular and long-distance customers.22  This decision marks an 
appropriate return to the principles that animated federal 
                                                     
14 Belson, supra note 4. 
15 See infra Part I, The Origins of Telecommunications Taxation. 
16 Scott Palladino & Stacy Mazer, Telecommunications Tax Policies: 
Implications for the Digital Age, NATIONAL GOVERNOR’S ASSOCIATION, Feb. 2, 
2000, available at 
http://www.nga.org/portal/site/nga/menuitem.df1f119f25022e6ae8ebb856a1101
0a0/ (follow “All Publications” hyperlink; then follow “Telecommunications 
Tax Policies: Implications for the Digital Age” hyperlink). 
17 See Pryce, supra note 9. 
18 Louis Alan Talley, The Federal Excise Tax on Telephone Service: A History, 
CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS 1 (Jan. 4, 2001), available at 
http://opencrs.cdt.org/document/RL30553/.
19 Id. 
20 Id.  
21 See Reese Bros., Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 229, 241 (3d Cir. 2006); 
Fortis, Inc. v. United States, 447 F.3d 190, 191 (2d Cir. 2006); OfficeMax, Inc. 
v. United States, 428 F.3d 583, 588 (6th Cir. 2005); Am. Bankers Ins. Group v. 
United States, 408 F.3d 1328, 1334 (11th Cir. 2005); Nat'l R.R. Passenger Corp. 
v. United States, 431 F.3d 374, 374 (Fed. Cir. 2005). 
22 See Pryce, supra note 9. 
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telecommunications taxation at its inception and constitutes a step towards 
the proper recalibration of such taxation to fit modern society.  
¶6 State taxation of the telecommunications industry likewise dates to 
the early twentieth century and also has ceased to be supported by its 
original justifications.23  In the industry’s formative and developmental 
years, the general economic assumption was that the most efficient 
mechanism for growth was the granting of statewide monopolies.24  In 
return for the exclusive right to furnish phone services within a given state’s 
borders, a monopolist company would be subject to lofty industry-specific 
taxation.25  This taxation was enacted and administered by states with the 
implicit provision that the telecommunications provider would then be 
permitted to set rates at a level that would allow it to recoup its fees from 
consumers.26 
¶7 With the advent of competitive markets in the telecommunications 
industry, the justifications for industry-specific taxation disappeared.27  
When cellular companies entered the market without state-granted 
monopolies, without the use of public rights-of-way, and without any of the 
previously attendant opportunities for recoupment, industry-specific 
taxation became an anachronism.28  State taxation of telecommunications 
has simply failed to keep pace with the revolutionary changes in the 
market.29  In fact, instead of decreasing, the effective rate of state and local 
taxation has increased in recent years.30  This simply cannot be justified. 
¶8 The city and local taxes at issue in T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. 
Department of Finance for Baltimore City31 are perfect examples of the 
recently prolific departure from the original rationale for disproportional 
taxation of the telecommunications industry.  Instead of being related in any 
way to monopoly power or controlled ratemaking, such taxation simply 
represents an effort to remedy budget shortfalls by the arbitrary and 
convenient taxation of cellular providers.32 
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26 Id. 
27 Id. at 8. 
28 Id. at 7. 
29 Id. 
30 See Mackey, supra note 2, at 182. 
31 T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dept. of Finance for Baltimore City, 2006 WL 
1976188 at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Jun. 29, 2006). 
32 See Belson, supra note 4. 
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II. THE T-MOBILE DECISION 
¶9 In July 2003, Maryland’s Montgomery County amended its 
Telephone Tax ordinance to include the imposition of a $2 per month tax on 
every cellular line sold to a resident of the county.33  In August 2004, 
Baltimore implemented a Wireless Telecommunications Tax that levied a 
$3.50 per month tax on each line sold.34  These two jurisdictions enacted 
their respective taxes by taking advantage of their special status as 
Maryland’s Charter Home Rule County and Charter Home Rule City, 
respectively.35  This status allowed the two local governments to impose 
certain taxes without securing specific authorization from the Maryland 
General Assembly.36 
¶10 Cellular providers T-Mobile, Cingular, Sprint, and Verizon 
Wireless joined forces in opposing the two taxes, both as they were being 
drafted and after they were implemented.37  The providers argued that 
because Maryland had designed a system in which the state taxed wireless 
communications while granting local governments the authority to tax 
public utilities, including land-line communications, the Baltimore City and 
Montgomery County levies imposed a burden upon cellular users that 
exceeded that imposed upon land-line users.38  The providers asserted that 
this disproportional taxation unfairly resulted in one segment of taxpayers, 
namely the cellular industry and its customers, funding the general 
obligations of the local government.39  These arguments fell on deaf ears, 
even as Baltimore collected $9.98 million in the first year of its tax, and as 
Montgomery County took in roughly $45 million from the tax’s inception in 
2003 to 2005.40 
¶11 In addition to arguing that these industry-specific taxes were 
inequitable, the four wireless companies asserted that the taxes were illegal 
                                                     
33 Kenneth H. Silverberg & Todd Tidgewell, Cellular Phone Companies 
Challenge Local Taxes in Maryland, STATE AND LOCAL TAX ADVISOR (Nixon 
Peabody LLP), Mar. 23, 2005, at 1 available at 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/linked_media/publications/SALTA_03232005.p
df.  
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. at 2. 
39 Id. at 1. 
40 See Doug Donovan, Court OKs Tax on Cell Phones, BALTIMORE SUN, Jul. 4, 
2006, at 1.B, available at 
http://www.topix.net/content/trb/08650515722306231606161966748418229069
40. 
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as well.41  Maryland state law explicitly precludes cities and counties from 
imposing sales or use taxes, except on utilities, and wireless carriers are not 
encompassed by the statutory definition of “utilities.”42  Convinced of the 
merits of their case, the providers determined to seek legal relief.43  Because 
Maryland law requires taxpayers challenging local taxation to first seek 
administrative remedies, the carriers filed refund claims in December 2004 
with the appropriate authorities of Montgomery County and Baltimore for 
the amounts paid under the respective taxes.44  When both localities issued 
final determinations denying refund claims, the wireless companies filed 
suit in the Maryland Tax Court.45 
A. The Maryland Tax Court’s Holding  
¶12 The Maryland Tax Court is an “independent agency [that] provides 
the highest administrative level in the state and local tax-related appeals 
process.”46  The Tax Court consolidated the individual carriers’ cases 
against Montgomery County and Baltimore for the purpose of determining 
the “only remaining legal issue,” in particular “whether the tax on mobile 
communications service is an impermissible sales tax.”47  The court’s 
holding on this issue would be pivotal.  A ruling that the city and county 
taxes were impermissible sales taxes would mark a substantial victory for 
the cellular industry, halting the tide of local taxation and making it 
substantially more difficult for localities to enact industry-specific levies.  A 
ruling affirming the taxes as viable would have the opposite effect of 
encouraging counties, cities, and municipalities nationwide to augment their 
budgets by applying extensive taxation to the cellular industry while 
passing it off as unrelated to sales. 
¶13 The Maryland Tax Court wasted little time in indicating that it 
would rule in favor of Baltimore and Montgomery County.  In the first few 
paragraphs of its Memorandum of Grounds for Decision, it referred to the 
Baltimore City tax as an “excise tax” and emphasized that the Montgomery 
County tax was applied to any entity that “furnishes”—not “sells”—cellular 
lines.48  Having established this groundwork, the court went on to apply 
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47 T-Mobile USA, Inc. v. Dept. of Finance for Baltimore City, 2006 WL 
1976188 at *1 (Md. Tax Ct. Jun. 29, 2006). 
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Maryland precedent to hold the taxes in question permissible as local excise 
taxes, not sales taxes, and to reject the carriers’ refund claims.49 
¶14 The court relied almost exclusively on a single case, Montgomery 
County v. Maryland Soft Drink Ass’n, Inc.50 in reaching its conclusion.  
In Soft Drink, the Maryland Court of Appeals set forth a two-factor test for 
determining whether a given tax may properly be conceived of as a sales 
tax.51  The first requirement is that a taxable sale be the event that triggers 
payment of the tax.52  Second, the tax must be applied against the purchase 
price of the good or service involved in the taxable sale.53  
¶15 The Maryland Tax Court held that the levies in question in T-
Mobile failed to satisfy either the “event” or “application” prong of the Soft-
Drink test.54  The cellular providers had argued that the relevant taxable 
event was the sale of a wireless line to a customer and that the tax was 
applied to the purchase price of each line.55  Although this argument in fact 
captured the reality of the taxes being imposed, the court rejected it 
outright.56  Instead it held that “the furnishing or providing the wireless line 
is the taxable event for the purposes of this tax . . . whether through a sale or 
otherwise” and that the tax was applied to “the number of lines furnished by 
the wireless company during the month.”57 
B. Analysis of the Court’s Reasoning 
¶16 With respect to the first prong of Soft Drink—the taxable event—
the court heavily emphasized the determination that both the Baltimore and 
Montgomery County taxes were applicable to all lines “provided or 
furnished, whether through a sale or otherwise.”58  The court even went so 
far as to state that “it is unnecessary to consider the economic transaction 
between the wireless company and the customer.”59  Yet, the very nature of 
the cellular phone industry makes disregarding the economic transaction 
entirely inappropriate.  The localities were taxing each line that a carrier 
provided to a customer.  Certainly, the wide variety of pricing plans in the 
cellular industry could lead to a situation in which a phone and number 
would be provided to a customer for free, if accompanied by the 
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commencement of a service agreement.  But, phone lines and their 
accompanying service are not donated by cellular carriers to their 
customers; they are sold.  The monthly tax is collected from each line, and 
each line is part of a sale of cellular phone service.  Semantics aside, the 
first prong was determined to be unfulfilled erroneously. 
¶17 With respect to the second prong, application to purchase price, the 
Tax Court held that “the telephone tax does not satisfy the second 
identifying characteristic of a sales tax as set forth in Soft Drink.”60 The 
Court continued: “[R]egardless of whether a customer ever uses, or is billed 
for, a wireless line, the telephone tax is due at the stated rate per month.”61  
Again, this ruling disregards the reality of the cellular industry.  Adding a 
$2.00 or $3.50 surcharge to a monthly cellular phone bill is absolutely a tax 
upon that bill.  While it is certainly true that the applied rate of tax is 
dependent upon the customer’s balance for a given month, it remains the 
case that the tax is being added each month to the price of the cellular phone 
line. 
¶18 Nevertheless, the Maryland Tax Court disagreed and rejected the 
refund claims brought by T-Mobile, Cingular, Sprint, and Verizon Wireless.  
The court concluded in unequivocal fashion, decreeing that “[a] flat tax on a 
telephone line, which does not vary depending on customer usage, is an 
excise tax rather than a sales tax under Maryland law.”62  The ramifications 
of this decision are likely to be profound.  The Tax Court has signaled to 
cities, counties, towns, and municipalities that their efforts to impose 
inordinately high tax rates upon the cellular industry will be rewarded.  
Rather than taking a step towards reducing the peculiarly high tax rates 
imposed upon a non-harmful, non-monopolistic industry, the Maryland Tax 
Court provided an invitation for local governments to lift those rates even 
higher. 
III. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DISPROPORTIONAL CELLULAR TAXATION 
¶19 The arguments in opposition to taxation of the cellular industry at 
rates that are disproportional to those applied to similar fields are manifold 
and will be briefly enumerated here.  
¶20 First, disproportional taxation harms the telecommunications 
industry as it relates to other industries, placing a burden upon 
telecommunications that is simply not present in comparable fields.63  The 
tax structure applied to telecommunications makes it among the highest 
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taxed industries in the U.S. economy.64  Only the alcohol, tobacco, and 
petroleum industries have higher tax rates, and this is for socially and 
economically justifiable reasons.65  Alcohol and tobacco taxes stem from 
their respective industries’ extraordinarily high associated social and health 
costs.66  Petroleum taxes are user fees or benefit taxes; the proceeds from 
such levies are often dedicated to maintaining and improving intra- or 
interstate transportation infrastructures.67  There are no such considerations 
present in the cellular industry.  Cellular phones do not impose these kinds 
of substantial health, social, or infrastructure costs on society; that their 
taxation is on par with products that do is unjustifiable.68 
¶21 Second, disproportional taxation harms the telecommunications 
industry internally by decreasing incentive for investment.69  The 
imposition of excessive taxes upon cellular providers discourages them 
from increasing research and development expenditures and reduces their 
commitment to increasing and enhancing their infrastructure.70  The irony is 
that state officials and economic experts are “intent on expanding 
investment in telecommunications infrastructure to expand the availability 
of ‘broadband’ service to more households and businesses.”71  In fact, an 
animating concern in the federal government’s recent repeal of the federal 
excise tax was just this; as Senator John McCain stated, “Today’s 
telecommunications services should not be taxed as utilities so that 
companies can invest in broadband and other networks.”72  If state and local 
governments are sincere in their interest in increasing industry-wide 
investment in infrastructure, they must abandon disproportional taxation. 
¶22 Finally, as mentioned above, the justifications for supporting 
elevated rates of taxation in the telecommunications industry have long 
since vanished and cannot continue to be used as cover for state and local 
governments to remedy their budget shortfalls.  Federal taxation of 
telecommunications was initiated via the federal excise tax in 1898 as a tax 
upon what was then a luxury good, for the purpose of financing the 
Spanish-American War.73  The Spanish-American War is over, long 
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distance telephone calls are no longer a luxury item, and the federal 
government has appropriately abandoned application of this outdated tax to 
cellular communications.  Anachronistic state and local rates of taxation, 
however, remain from the days of “Ma Bell,” telephone monopolies, and 
controlled ratemaking.74  In fact, not only do these rates remain, but they are 
increasing, and almost exclusively because local governments have 
discovered the ease and profitability with which they can be collected.75  
The president of Baltimore’s City Council, Sheila Dixon, said it best in 
describing how the Wireless Communications Tax at issue in T-Mobile 
single-handedly remedied the city’s budget crisis, “I can’t remember the last 
time we had such an easy budget year. . . . [W]hen you can’t diversify and 
the federal and state taxes are drying up, you need other income.”76  Until it 
is judicially or legislatively affirmed that the justifications for 
disproportionately high taxation of the cellular industry have long ceased to 
remain valid, city and local governments will continue their plunder.  
IV. CONCLUSION 
¶23 The future of telecommunications taxation is highly uncertain.  
State and local lawmakers in California, Massachusetts, New York, and 
other states are currently considering hundreds of new cellular tax 
proposals.77  The decision handed down by the Maryland Tax Court in T-
Mobile will only serve to embolden localities searching for a plentiful, 
legally-enforceable source of income.  On the other hand, multiple bills 
seeking to limit or freeze such cellular phone taxation are in the works in 
Congress, including one that recently garnered the near-unanimous support 
of the Senate Commerce Committee.78  That proposal, which passed by a 
twenty-two to one vote but is expected to encounter some resistance on the 
Senate floor, would enact a three-year moratorium on new state cell phone 
taxes, prohibiting states from instituting any levies that single out wireless 
providers for additional taxation.79  The proposed legislation would not, 
however, prevent states from enacting new measures that affect the 
telecommunications industry uniformly, providing a loophole for levies that 
apply new charges to cellular communications and land-line 
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communications equivalently.80  It also would have no effect on existing 
laws against cellular providers.81  
¶24 The next few years will likely be determinative of the future of 
cellular taxation. Perhaps cellular consumers, fed up with constantly 
increasing charges, will object loudly enough to halt or even reverse the 
trend of escalating taxation.  On the other hand, perhaps consumer objection 
alone will not be capable of stemming the tide.  It seems just as likely that 
in the absence of stronger, much more aggressive federal legislation, city 
and local governments will continue to administer elevated taxes against the 
telecommunications industry as the Maryland example proves.  Localities 
need money to operate, and with wireless providers as an easy target, 
decisions such as T-Mobile will only encourage the trend of disproportional 
taxation to continue. 
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